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The Supreme Court and
the Federal Employers'

Liability Act, 1958-1959 Termt
In this Article, the author analyzes the FederalEmployers'
Liability Act cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States during the 1958-1959 term. Despite the abundance of denials of review and per curiam opinions, Mr.
DeParcq draws a number of practical conclusions concerning the attitude of the Court toward FELA litigation.

William H. DeParcq*
Since the 1956-1957 term of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the succeeding terms have included increasingly fewer decisions involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In the 19561957 term, the Court decided eleven FELA cases, including the
landmark case of Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R.1 and its companion
cases.2 The year which followed was much quieter, with only five
relevant decisions, the primary impact of which was merely to illustrate the ramifications of the principle proclaimed in the Rogers
case.3 But, the 1958-1959 term has been even quieter. The four
FELA cases decided by the Court this term are not of great practical
importance, either singly or together. Yet by looking at these cases,
together with those which the Court refused to review, and by comparing the Court's action during this term with its action in the two
preceding terms, it is possible to make some important predictions
concerning future Supreme Court interpretation of the FELA.
The first pertinent case decided by the Court this term was an
old friend, Deen v. Gulf, Colo. & S.F.R.R. Earl Deen's duties ref This Article is the substance of an address made before the National Association
of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys at its annual convention held in Miami,
Florida, in August 1959.
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. 853 U.S. 500 (1957).
2. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions of the 1956-1957 term involving the FELA, see DeParcq, The Supreme Court and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 1956-57 Term, 36 Tkc.s L. REv. 145 (1957).
8. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions of the 1957-1958 term involving the FELA, see DeParcq, The Supreme Court and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 1957-58 Term, 31 RocE- MT. L. BEv. 22 (1958).
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quired him to empty a babbitt pot which, with its contents, weighed
more than half a ton. His leg was broken when the pot slipped as
he and a fellow employee were tipping it to empty it; consequently,
a jury awarded Deen damages of $21,450. However, he was to become involved in a flood of appellate litigation before ultimately
becoming entitled to any of that amount. A Texas court of civil
appeals, regarding the evidence of the employer's negligence as
insufficient upon which to base liability, ordered judgment for the
defendant; the subsequent per curiam reversal of this judgment by
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1957, was accompanied
only by the Court's usual terse statement that "the proofs justified
with reason the jury's conclusion that employer negligence played a
part in producing the petitioner's injury." 4 On remand to the Texas
court of civil appeals, the railroad argued that the verdict was excessive and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. That
court held that the decision of the Supreme Court foreclosed any
question concerning weight of the evidence, but it upheld the defendant's contention that the verdict was excessive and ordered a
remittitur.5 On writs of error brought by both parties, the Texas
Supreme Court regarded the power of a state court to order a new
trial on the ground that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence as a matter of state procedure, over which the United States
Supreme Court, on the basis of its previous decisions, has indicated
that it will not take jurisdiction. It remanded the case 6for the court
of civil appeals to make its own independent evaluation "wholly
apart from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United
States" 7 as to whether the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. At this juncture, it was Deen's turn to retaliate and further complicate the case. He sought a writ of mandamus from the
Supreme Court of the United States to vacate the Texas Supreme
Court's order remanding the case and to compel entry of judgment
in accordance with the verdict of the jury. In another per curiam
opinion, agreed to by all the members of the Court except Mr. Justice Stewart, who took no part in the decision, the Supreme Court
held that Deen was entitled to the writ of mandamus, saying with
regard to the claim about manifest weight of the evidence: "The
determination of that issue was foreclosed by Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. . ...
It is not entirely clear from this cryptic per curiam opinion what
the Supreme Court intended to imply. Its equally cryptic per curiam
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

353 U.S. 925 (1957).
806 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
312 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1958).
Id. at 942.
Deen v. Hickman, 858 U.S. 57, 58 (1958).
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opinion of a few years ago in Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R.R was
susceptible of being interpreted to mean that in an FELA case a
state appellate court cannot validly order a new trial for the employing carrier on the ground that the verdict is against the weight

of the evidence. Of course, a trial judge, whether state or federal,
has an undoubted right to set aside a verdict and order a new trial
if he considers the verdict contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. Perhaps erroneously, the Illinois Supreme Court has construed the Harsh decision to foreclose an appellate review of the
weight of the evidence on appeal by the railroad company where
the plaintiff has received the verdict and judgment below; and the
Supreme Court of the United States refused to review that decision. 10
Of course, the Harsh and Bowman cases, foreclosing appellate review of the weight of the evidence when the appeal is by the railroad, must be read and interpreted in the light of the very strong
policy of the Supreme Court of the United States and of courts
generally to interpret and apply the FELA liberally in favor of the
injured employee. What these cases actually mean with reference to
appellate power and scope of review generally ought to be made
more clear by the Court, as evidenced by the fact that commentators
are still offering a variety of possible explanations for the Deen
decision."
Even the second Supreme Court per curiam opinion did not terminate litigation in the Deen case. When the case went back on remand, the Texas Supreme Court acquiesced in the United States
Supreme Court's decision and ordered judgment for Deen, but it
affirmed the remittitur which the court of civil appeals had imposed. 2 One judge dissented, however, saying:
I think the Act does not contemplate an issue of excessive verdicts or
the granting of a remittitur by the trial court or the Court of Civil Ap-

peals. See Neese v. Southern Railway Company, 1955, 350 U.S. 77....
To allow a remittitur would nullify a material portion of the Act. It,

no doubt, was the intention of the Congress
to place the power of evalu3
ating evidence solely with the jury.'
Once more Deen applied for certiorari, this time to review the
order of remittitur, but his petition was denied, over Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissent.'4 Thus, after three years of litigation, including
three trips to the Supreme Court of the United States, Earl Deen
9. 348 U.S. 940 (1955), reversing, 351 IM.App. 272, 114 N.E.2d 901 (1953).
10. Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 I1. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104, cert. denied,

355 U.S. 837 (1957).

11. See, e.g., Note, 37 TExAs L. RF-v. 96, 99 (1958).
12. 317 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1958).
13. Id. at 915.
14. 359 U.S. 945 (1959).
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finally obtained judgment for a portion of the damages awarded
him by a jury.
A curt per curiam opinion also served to dispose of the only other
case to reach the Court this term involving issues of negligence and
scope of review. John Henry Moore, a baggage handler in St. Louis,
was injured while seeking to maneuver a baggage cart through a
narrow space on the platform. While he was turning the cart, it
pivoted against a car of a train moving on an adjacent track, causing
Moore to be thrown against a car of another train which was on the
track on the opposite side of the platform. Believing that the evidence showed affirmatively that the injury was caused by Moore's
own act in turning the cart, and not by his employer's failure to provide him with a safe place to work, the Missouri Supreme Court
ordered judgment for the defendant despite a jury verdict for plaintiff. 5 The Supreme Court of the UnitedStates reinstated plaintiffs
verdict with its now usual brief per curiam opinion, holding "that
the proofs justified with reason the jury's conclusion that employer
6 Mr.
negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's injury."1'
Justice Frankfurter, as usual, voted to dismiss the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted. Mr. Justice Harlan, following his practice
of the 1957-1958 term, concurred in the result only.'7 Justices Whittaker and Burton dissented, saying: "To hold that these facts are
sufficient to make a jury case of negligence under the Act is in practical effect to say that a railroad is an insurer of its employees. Such
is not the law." 18
The case of Baker v. Texas & Pac. Ry. 19 involved the death of a
laborer who was engaged in work along a right of way. The deceased had been hired by a contractor who 'was performing the
work under a contract with the railroad, but there was evidence to
show that the work comprised part of the maintenance task of the
railroad, that the railroad furnished the material to be used, and
that one of its employees supervised the individual workmen. Suit
was brought against the railroad under the FELA. A Texas trial
court refused to submit a special issue to the jury as to whether the
deceased was employed by the railroad, holding as a matter of law
that he was not. A Texas court of civil appeals affirmed this decision,
15. Moore v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 312 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1958).
16. 858 U.S. 31 (1958).
17. Id. at 32. He based his concurrence upon his memorandum opinion in Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18, 19 (1957), in which he said that (1) once certiorari
has been granted even though improvidently, the court should consider the merits
of the case, and that (2) although he disagreed with the reasoling and the view
of negligence enunciated in Rogers, he felt presently bound by it.
18. 358 U.S. at 85.
19. 359 U.S. 227 (1959), reversing 309 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. In its per
curiam opinion, the Court said, in part:
The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not use the terms "employee"
and "employed" in any special sense ... so that the familiar general legal
problems as to whose "employee" or servant" a worker is at a given time
present themselves as matters of federal law under the Act. . . . [W]e
think it perfectly plain that the question, like that of fault or causation
under the Act, contains factual eements such as to make it one for the
jury under appropriate instructions as to the relevant factors under law.20

Except for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who again thought certiorari
had been improvidently granted, the Court was unanimous in that
case, including Mr. Justice Stewart who had by then taken his place
on the bench.
The final pertinent decision decided on the merits during the
1958-1959 term raised an interesting question concerning the statute
of limitations. Michael Glus contracted an industrial disease in 1952
as a result of unsafe working conditions provided by his employer.
He did not bring suit until 1957, by which time the three year statute of limitations of the act 2 ' had of course expired. In his complaint
he alleged, however, that "'defendant's agents, servants and employees fraudulently or unintentionally misstated to plaintiff that he
had seven years within which to bring an action against said defendant as a result of his industrial disease and in reliance thereon plaintiff withheld suit until the present time."' 2 2 When defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations,
plaintiff asserted that the statute had been tolled by defendant's
fraud or misrepresentations.
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit held that Glus's suit
was barred, relying, although somewhat reluctantly, on earlier Second Circuit decisions; these precedents held that where a statute of
limitations is "built in" as an integral part of a statute (such as the
FELA), creating a new remedy unknown to the common law, the
period of limitation is a matter of substance and cannot be tolled. 23
However, all nine Justices of the Supreme Court joined in Mr. Justice Black's opinion reversing the lower court decisions and holding
that if Glus could prove his allegations that the defendant's responsible agents had induced the delay in bringing suit by false representations, he could collect for his disease.2 4 The Court merely said that
it had been shown nothing in the language or history of the act to
indicate that the ancient principle that no man may take advantage
of his own wrong was not to apply in suits arising under the statute.
20. 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959).
21. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952).
22. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Term., 154 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afftd,
253 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1958).
23. ibid.
24. 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
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Finally, there is one case in which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari during the 1958-1959 term25 but in which it did not reach
a decision on the merits until early in the 1959-1960 term. An Ohio
court held that an accident in which a grade-crossing watchman
was hit by an automobile driven by a drunken driver violating five
traffic ordinances was not reasonably foreseeable and that therefore
the railroad was under no duty to provide protection against it.26
In the four cases decided on the merits, the Court continues to
insist on a broad construction of the act and on the historic role of
the jury. It has continued to apply the Rogers principle that it is
enough for liability that employer negligence played any part, even
the smallest, in causing the injury, and it has refused to permit state
courts to evade that rule under the guise of judging the weight of
the evidence. The question of whether a person is an "employee"
and thus within the act has been held to be a question of fact for
a jury to determine, and a liberal rule has been applied to the tolling
of the statute of limitations.
There were no surprises in the voting patterns revealed by these
few cases. The Court was always unanimous, except for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's refusal to vote on the merits in three of the four cases,
and in the fourth case, the Moore case, the Court divided along the
same line as it had in the two preceding terms. The new member
of the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart, held for the injured employee in
both of the cases in which he participated. There had been much
press comment at the time of his appointment to the Court that his
record on the Sixth Circuit was not notably pro-employee in FELA
cases, but these two decisions are not enough to shed any light, one
way or the other, on that proposition.
What the Supreme Court did this term is actually less enlightening than what it did not do. The cases in which certiorari was denied are in many ways more illuminating than the cases reviewed
by the Court on the merits. There were five cases during the year
in which the employee was successful below and the railroad petitioned for certiorari. Two of these were the most routine sort of
cases, in which state appellate courts held that the evidence justified
25. Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 359 U.S. 958 (1959).
26. In the Inman case, an important case decided on the merits early in the
1959-1960 term and subsequent to delivery of the speech which furnished the basis
for this Article, the Supreme Court affirmed 5-4 a reversal by the Supreme Court of
Ohio of a jury verdict for an injured employee, on the ground that on the basis of
the evidence no reasonable man could find the existence of employer negligence in
the case. Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 80 S. Ct. 242 (1959). It is interesting to
note that of the FELA cases accepted for review during the 1958-1959 term this unfortunate decision is the only one in which the Court wrote more than a per curiam
opinion. Another notable feature of the case is the vote of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
who abandoned his almost inflexible position in earlier cases of refusal to decide on
the merits cases in which he deemed a writ to have been improvidently granted.
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submission to the jury of negligence issues.2 7 It is hard to understand
how even the partisanship of counsel could have imagined that the
Supreme Court would review such decisions. And a decision of the
Third Circuit, a
g a verdict of $250,000 in a wrongful death
action where the railroad contended that the deceased, an electrical
engineer employed and paid by a locomotive manufacturer to ride
on regular train runs and service electric locomotives, was not an
"employee" of the railroad, is consistent with the holding in the
Baker case this term that
it is for the jury to determine the issue of
23
who is an "employee."
However, the other two cases in which employer petitions were
denied are somewhat more illuminating. In a Florida case, the trial
court, quite inadvertently, failed to read to the jury that portion of
the instructions agreed upon which informed the jury to reduce
plaintiff's verdict, if any, in the event that they found contributory
negligence. Although the defendant's counsel objected to this omission at the conclusion of the instructions, he did so in an unclear
manner. The appellate court held that the inadvertent failure to
give this portion of the instruction was not reversible error in the
absence of a clear and specific objection. 9
The other case came up from the Second Circuit. It involved a
car inspector engaged in car commodity classification who, in order
to avoid walking in the snow and to keep up with the moving cars,
swung up into a gondola car which he thought was empty. When
the car stopped, the steel plates in the car shifted, pinning his leg
against the side of the car. The jury returned a general verdict for
plaintiff but also found specially that his presence in the gondola
car was not within the performance of his duties. The Second Circuit said that the inconsistency between the verdict and the answer
to a special interrogatory required a new trial. The railroad claimed
that judgment should have been entered in its favor on the basis of
the special interrogatory, but the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to a new trial so that there might be submitted to the jury
the issue of whether the railroad knew or should have known that
an employee engaged in car commodity classification might be
riding in a gondola car.
The score, then, for the railroads this term was no petitions
27. Wehrli v. Wabash R.R., 315 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1958), cert. denied, 858 U.S.
932 (1959); Bush v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 310 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958).
28. Byrne v. Pennsylvania R.R., 262 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 960 (1959).
29. Butler v. Watts, 103 So. 2d 123 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 926
(1959).
30. Siegrist v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 263 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied
360 U.S. 917 (1959).
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granted out of five submitted, precisely their record in the preceding
term. There were thirteen petitions for review filed last term by
employees who were unsuccessful in the lower courts. In five such
cases, as we have seen, review was granted, and the employee won
in the Supreme Court in the four of these cases which were heard
this term. 31 In eight cases the employee's petition was denied and
the unfavorable judgment below permitted to stand.
Many of the cases in this latter group involved procedural issues,
such as a refusal to give an instruction requested by a plaintiff
where it was arguable that the matter was not fully covered by the
instructions given,32 a refusal to issue a writ of mandamus to review
a transfer order,38 and a refusal under Rule 60 to reopen a judgment
adverse to the employee. 4 Potentially, the most interesting of the
cases in this category is one originating in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in which a local rule providing for
pre-trial examination of the plaintiff by an "impartial" medical expert was challenged. The unreported decision of the Third Circuit
refusing to entertain an application for a writ of mandamus was
issued without the benefit of written briefs or oral argument, and
may thus merely reflect a view that the case was inappropriate for
mandamus, and that the matter could be reviewed, if necessary, on
appeal from a final judgment. In any event, and for whatever reason, the Supreme Court denied review. 5
In addition to the Deen case, there were three other cases before
31. Of course, the petitioning employee lost in the fifth relevant case accepted
for review in the 1958-1959 term, as a result of the Court's decision in Inman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 80 S. Ct. 242 (1959). However, the evidence of employer negligence in this case was extremely weak, in fact, so weak that the majority said:
In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, ... we laid down the rule that
"judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all
in the injury or death." In measuring Ohio's disposition of the case here by the
Rogers yardstick, we must affirm. The Act does not make the employer an insurer. . . . [W]e believe that the evidence here was so thin that, on a judicial
appraisal, the conclusion must be drawn that negligence on the part of the
railroad could have played no part in petitioner's injury.
80 S. Ct. 242, 243-44. (Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, it was a 5-4 decision. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom the Chief Justice
and Justices Black and Brennan concurred, saying: "It is not clear beyond argument
of reasonable men that the respondent could not have foreseen an injury to petitioner
by a reckless motorist or that it took every precaution that reasonableness under the
circumstances required." Id. at 246.
32. Brinkley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 254 F.2d 598 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 865 (1958).
33. Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958).
The transfer order was made pursuant to 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1958).
34. Dougall v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 256 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 883 (1958).
35. Hankinson v. Van Dusen, 359 U.S. 925 (1959).
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the Court this term which involved issues concerning the sufficiency
of the evidence. One rather perplexing case came up from Ohio
where the state court, 36 in an opinion that seems heedless of the
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the FELA, held that
"there must be a proximate cause," 37 relied on state non-FELA cases
for the meaning of "proximate cause," and determined that on the
facts before it the defendant's negligence was, as a matter of law,
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The denial of
certiorari in this case would be difficult to understand except for
the fact that the Ohio court, rather than ordering judgment for defendant, had merely ordered a new trial. Thus the state court judgment was not "final" as it must be for review by certiorari. This
explanation accounts also for another case where a new trial was
granted, but where otherwise the holding that the evidence was
insufficient would seem improper. 8 The only other pertinent case
is one in which the Seventh Circuit held that "without a doubt" the
district court had correctly directed a verdict for the defendant
where the plaintiff's evidence "amounts to nothing more than pure
fantasy and contains even less substance than broth brewed from
the bones of a stewed pigeon."39 Obviously, this case compels little
attention here.
What conclusions can be drawn from this mass of per curiam
opinions and denials of review? One conclusion which seems to be
rather clearly emerging is that markedly fewer petitions are granted
from the lower federal courts than from the state courts. In my review a year ago of the decisions of the 1957-1958 term, I stated: "It
is interesting, but it is too early to tell whether it is mere coincidence,
that the Supreme Court granted all five petitions by employees for
certiorari to state courts, and denied all five such petitions addressed40
to federal courts. Only time will tell whether this is of significance."
What time thus far has told is that this term the Court granted four
of the seven petitions for certiorari addressed to state courts, while
granting only one of six-in the Glus case involving the tolling of the
statute of limitations -to a federal court. Combining the results of
the two years, the Court has granted review of state court decisions
in nine out of twelve cases but has granted review of a federal court
decision in only one case out of eleven. Yet, from reading the opin86. Wright v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 107 Ohio App. 310, 152 N.E.2d
421 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 979 (1959).
37. Id. at 314, 152 N.E.2d at 423.
38 Simpson v. Kansas City Connecting Ry., 312 S.W.2d 113 (Mo.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 825 (1958).
39. Baum v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 256 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 881 (1958). The evidence in this case established merely that the plaintiff,
a section gang laborer who was off duty but on call, had left the bunkhouse to go

fishing, and that seven hours later his mutilated body was found near the tracks.
40. DeParcq, supra note 3, at 32.
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ions of lower courts, it is not obvious that the lower federal courts
are any happier with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the role
of the jury than are the state courts. Perhaps the disproportion in
these figures indicates that the Court is more confident that the
lower federal courts will apply the law as declared by the Supreme
Court, whether they like it or not, than that the state courts will
do the same.
One of the most astute observers of the Supreme Court regards
the area of protecting jury trial as one in which the Court is unable
to make its will felt. He points out that the Court has used its full
power in attempting to do so, especially by mass reversals of lower
court opinions, and that it has given an extraordinary amount of
attention to this question, but, he says: "The results are unimpressive." 41 With respect, I disagree. As I read the cases, it seems that
the lower courts, state and federal, are leaving issues to juries today
where, even as recently as two or three years ago, they would have
resolved the issues as matters of law. Given the attitude which the
Supreme Court has expressed in recent terms, I cannot believe that
any plaintiff who has been the victim of a directed verdict, or the
recipient of a jury verdict only to have it taken away and judgment
ordered for defendant, would fail to petition for certiorari. Yet, in
the term just ended, there were only two such cases presented to
the Supreme Court-the case of the baggage handler, where the
Supreme Court reversed the Missouri court, and the decision of the
Seventh Circuit involving the laborer whose mutilated body was
found on the tracks, which the Supreme Court refused to review.
Only two terms ago there were eleven cases involving employees'
petitions which the Court actually reviewed.
It seems clear that a majority of the Supreme Court Justices favor
a liberal interpretation of the FELA with regard to its scope, available defenses, the meaning of negligence, and the like. But the
more important thread in the decisions seems to be the insistence of
that same majority on preserving jury trial as it was once known.
It is easy for us, who are professionally concerned primarily with
FELA litigation, to suppose that the Supreme Court's decisions relating to the role of the jury with which we are familiar are isolated
phenomena, peculiar to FELA suits. The fact is, however, that the
FELA decisions on the role of the jury are consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions, in all sorts of litigation, in which the
Court has sought to restore the jury to the pre-eminent position
42
which it once enjoyed. Thus the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
requiring federal courts to apply state law in diversity cases, has
been made to yield to the requirement of jury trial under the
41. FRNKi, MARBLE PALACE 33 (1958).
42. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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seventh amendment. Even though a particular issue is regarded in
a state as an issue for the judge to decide, the jury must decide it in
a federal action if it is the type of issue which historically has been
for the jury.43 In cases involving mingled legal and equitable claims,
it sometimes happens that a particular fact issue will be common
both to the legal and to the equitable claims. The scholars have
supposed that in that situation the judge is frequently free to decide
the issue for himself, rather than submitting it to a jury, but the
Supreme Court has held only this term that in such cases the common issue must always go to the jury.44 Even in a routine diversity
case, the Court has granted review and subsequently reversed the
decisions of a court of appeals which thought there was insufficient
evidence to submit a particular issue to a jury.45 It is significant that
in that case the Court cited two FELA cases as exemplifying the
"federal standard" for sufficiency of the evidence.
One final comment deserves to be made, especially in view of the
impassioned protests of the general counsel of the Illinois Central
Railroad 46 and other similarly unbiased observers, that the Court
has converted the act into a workmen's compensation act. In the
term just ended, eight employees who had lost below were denied
review of their cases by the Supreme Court. Those who say that the
Supreme Court has written absolute liability into the act are simply
ignoring the facts. However, despite the view of four Supreme Court
Justices 47 and some leading legal scholars 4 that the Court should
not grant certiorari in cases involving employees' petitions, I firmly
believe that any employee who has lost below as the result of an unjust verdict or decision may confidently expect relief from the Supreme Court.
43. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
44. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
45. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).

46. See Wright, The Employers' Liability Act: Does the Supreme Court Want It
Repealed?, 45 A.B.A.J. 151 (1959).
47. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Stewart, and Whittaker.
48. See, e.g., Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, 31 N.Y. ST. Bn BuLL, 66, 72,
76 (1959); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HAnv. L. REV. 84, 96-98 (1959).

